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Abstract: Most highways in urban China are tolled to finance their construction. During 
the eight-day National Day holiday in 2012, highway tolls are waived nationwide for 
passenger vehicles. We use this to test highway tolls’ effect on air pollution. Using daily 
pollution and weather data for 98 Chinese cities in 2011 and 2012 and employing both a 
regression discontinuity design and differences-in-differences method with 2011 National 
Day holiday as a control, we find that eliminating tolls increases pollution by 20% and 
decreases visibility by one kilometer. We also estimate that the toll elasticity of air 
pollution is 0.16. These findings complement the scant literature on the environmental 
impact of road pricing. 
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1 Introduction 
Vehicles generate a few types of negative externalities, such as traffic congestion, air 
pollution, and traffic accidents (Parry, et al., 2007), but much attention has focused on 
congestion externalities. To reduce traffic congestion to the socially-optimal level, a toll 
equal to congestion externalities should be charged (Walters, 1961). This congestion 
pricing theory has been modeled in various ways but few models consider pollution 
externalities resulting from vehicle emissions. 
1
 Congestion pricing has been practiced in 
some cities (for example, London and Stockholm), but empirical evidence on its effect on 
air pollution is scant. This study uses data from the removing of highway tolls in urban 
China and demonstrates that tolls can substantially decrease air pollution. 
China’s highway network has grown rapidly: expressway mileage grows from 522 
kilometers in 1990 to 41,005 in 2005, and is expected to reach 85,000 by 2020 (Yang and 
Lee, 2008, P.1).
2
 On most expressways a toll is charged to finance the capacity costs. Toll 
rates are regulated by provincial governments and vary by vehicle type, expressway, and 
province. 
3
 A Ministry of Transportation survey estimates that in 2010 a sample of twelve 
provinces collect RMB 100 billion toll revenue.
4
 Whether tolls are below or above the 
socially optimal level is unclear; however, eliminating tolls will certainly lead to excess 
vehicles on the road. One example is Shanghai Hujia Expressway. Built in 1988 and 
already at capacity, traffic flow increases by 20% the day after its toll is abolished on 
January 1, 2012.  
5
 
Urban air pollution is a serious issue in China. According to a World Bank survey of 186 
countries, the mean annual level of PM10, the concentration of particulate matter with 
diameter of 10 micrometers (μm) or less measured in microgram (ug) per cubic meter (m3), 
in urban China is 82 in 2011, making it the 22
th
 most polluted. 
6
 In 2003, total health costs 
due to air pollution are estimated to be 1.2 to 3.8% of China’s GDP (The World Bank, 
2007). In 2005, the economic costs of suspended particulates and ozone in China are 
estimated to be $112 billion (in 1997 US dollar) (Matus, et al., 2012).  
 
Vehicles are the major contributor to urban air pollution in China (Cai and Xie, 2007). A 
large proportion of vehicles travel on highways and most of these are passenger vehicles. 
In Beijing, passenger vehicles represent 82% of highways traffic, compared to 55% on 
arterials and 70% on residential roadways (Liu, et al., 2005). Removing highway tolls will 
lead to socially-excessive passenger vehicle travel due to more congestion and more 
emissions.  
 
                                                          
1
 For example, Arnott, et al. (1993) study the peak-period congestion pricing; Arnott (2007) studies 
congestion pricing when agglomeration economies are present. 
2
 In this paper we use highway and expressway interchangeably.  
3
 For a discussion of toll policy in Chinese provinces, see Yang and Lee (2008). 
4
 Data source (in Chinese): http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20111017/150210634992.shtml. 
5
 Source (in Chinese): http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/01-02/3577503.shtml. 
6 Source: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.13#. 
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Empirical studies on congestion pricing’s effect on air pollution are scarce. Daniel and 
Bekka (2000) adapt TRANPLAN, a widely used highway modeling program, to simulate 
the effect of congestion pricing on vehicle emissions using data from New Castle County, 
Delaware. They find that congestion pricing can reduce emissions from 5% to 15% on the 
major highways in different scenarios. Mitchell, et al. (2005) simulate the impact of 
different road pricing schemes on air quality using data from Leeds, UK. Anas and 
Lindsey (2011) review a few simulation and estimation studies in London, Stockholm, and 
Milan. These studies show that tolls can reduce vehicle emissions by 8.5% to 19% 
depending on the city, toll rate, and pollutant type. No similar studies have been conducted 
in China. 
This paper uses a quasi-natural experiment in China to study the effect of removing 
highway tolls on urban air pollution. This complements the empirical evidence on 
congestion pricing’s effect on air pollution. On July 24, 2012, the China State Council 
announces that highway tolls will be waived for passenger vehicles with fewer than eight 
seats during the four official holidays: Spring Festival, Tomb-Sweeping Day, Labor Day 
(May 1), and National Day (October 1), beginning with National Day 2012.
7
 There are 
eight days during the 2012 National Day holiday (September 30 to October 7, 2012), when 
highway tolls are first waived. We use the seven-day National Day holiday in 2011 
(October 1 to October 7, 2011) as the comparison. Since highways connect cities where 
trips start and end, a change in traffic flow on highways due to a change in tolls is highly 
correlated with a change in traffic flow in cities that highways connect. Therefore, this 
exogenous change in highway tolls enables us to test the effect of highway toll on urban air 
pollution. 
We use the daily air pollution and weather data for 98 major cities in China for 2011 and 
2012 and employ both a panel regression discontinuity design method and a differences-in-
differences method to test the effect of removing highway tolls on urban air pollution. The 
toll rate ranges from RMB 0.26 to 0.9 per passenger vehicle per kilometer depending on 
the city and highway. Removing the highway toll during the 2012 National Day holiday 
period increases urban air pollution (measured by air pollution index) by 20% compared 
with the National Day holiday period in 2011. We provide further evidence to show that 
this is not due to trip demand shifting from before or after the holiday to the holiday period. 
In addition, PM10 increases by 27% and visibility decreases by one kilometer. We also 
estimate the toll elasticity of pollution to be 0.16. These results imply increased congestion, 
pollution, and traffic accidents. Since toll revenues are a redistribution of wealth, our 
findings suggest that removing highway tolls lowers social welfare. A back-of-envelop 
calculation shows that during the eight days without tolls, the health costs incurred due to 
the increase in PM10 amount to at least RMB 1.18 billion in urban China. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a heuristic model to show 
that removing a toll will increase traffic flow and therefore vehicle emissions and air 
                                                          
7
 During the past few years, Spring Festival holiday includes seven days, Tomb-Sweeping Day three, Labor 
Day three, and National Day seven. The exact dates for those holidays, announced by the State Council 
according to the calendar, change each year with the calendar.  The National Day holiday in 2012 includes 
eight days. 
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pollution. Section 3 introduces the data and Section 4 the econometric models. Section 5 
presents the results and Section 6 concludes. 
2 Illustrative model 
Arnott and Kraus (2003) provide an excellent introduction to highway congestion pricing 
theory. This section adds vehicle pollution externalities to their model. We consider only 
short-run effects of toll policy and therefore assume road capacity is fixed. The simple 
model shows that social efficiency requires a toll equal to the sum of congestion and 
pollution externalities. Although congestion pricing has been implemented in some cities, 
vehicle emission pricing is rarely implemented and may be more complicated in both 
theory and practice (Anas and Lindsey, 2011; Coria, et al., 2013). Our simple model is 
intended to provide economic intuition for our econometric models.
8
  
 
Suppose each driver drives from point A to point B over a stretch of highway. Trip time T 
depends on the traffic flow-capacity ratio: ),(
S
N
TT   with 0'T and 0"T  where S is the 
maximum capacity of the highway and is assumed to be fixed in the short run, N the hourly 
traffic flow uniformly passing any point on the highway, 
S
N
 the flow-capacity ratio, and 
“´” the first order derivative. Assume hourly vehicle emissions, E, depend positively on 
both the flow capacity ratio and the traffic flow: ),( N
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),()(),( N
S
N
E
S
N
vTcN
S
N
ff  ,   (1) 
where  is the monetary value of travel time per hour and   the health or disutility cost of 
vehicle emissions in dollars.  The total user cost across all drivers is NfSNC ),( . The 
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where the first term on the right-hand side is the marginal private cost, the second the 
congestion externality, and the third the pollution externality. If the government charges a 
toll  , the full trip price to the user, P, is the individual trip cost plus the toll: 
(3)    .),(  N
S
N
fP  
                                                          
8
 For other types of road pricing with emissions, see Verhoef (2000), Johansson-Stenman (2006), Yin and 
Lawphongpanich (2006), and Bigazzi and Figliozzi (2013). 
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The trip demand function is )),(()(  N
S
N
fNPN , which determines the equilibrium 
flow rate (the number of trips in equilibrium) : ),(ˆ SNN  . In the short run, given 
capacity S, the social planner maximizes the total hourly social surplus on the highway 
which is the difference between total benefit (the area under the inverse trip demand curve) 
and total user costs up to the equilibrium flow rate: 
(4)     .)),,(ˆ()(
),(ˆ
0
SSNCdnnPMax
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
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From the first-order condition with respect to  , combining with equations (2) and (3), we 
can obtain the following result: 
N
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  .  (5) 
Equation (5) says that the optimal toll should be set equal to the sum of congestion and 
pollution externalities. 
Figure 1 illustrates further the intuition of the relation between the highway toll and 
congestion and pollution externalities. Without any toll, the number of vehicles on the road 
is N0. With a toll equal to the congestion externality, the number of vehicles on the road is 
N
*
 and with a toll equal to the sum of congestion and pollution externalities the number of 
vehicles on the road is further reduced to N
**
. In the absence of any toll, drivers consider 
only their private user cost and ignore the congestion and pollution externalities, leading to 
excessive travel relative to the socially optimal level. A toll can be charged to obtain this 
optimal level of traffic flow. 
Although we do not know whether the highway toll charged by local governments in 
China is greater or less than the sum of the congestion and pollution externalities, we do 
know that after it is lifted,  traffic flow will increase to N0 generating more congestion and 
vehicle emissions than before. Many highways pass through only the outskirts of cities; 
however, intra-city trips are often consumed along with inter-city trips (e.g., driving from a 
suburban residence to the inner city). Therefore, increased traffic flow on highways also 
increases vehicle emissions in cities where highway trips originate, pass through, or 
terminate. Increased traffic flow on highways may alter drivers’ route choice and this may 
change the distribution of pollutants over space in cities. We focus on the air quality at the 
city level and quantify by how much air pollution increases due to the lifting of the 
highway toll on passenger vehicles in Chinese cities. 
 
3 Data 
The two main data sets we use are the daily air pollution index (API) data and the daily 
weather conditions for major cities in China.  
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The city-level aggregate API ranges from 0 to 500 and depends on the concentrations of 
three pollutants measured at monitoring stations within a city: PM10, nitrogen dioxide 
(NO2), and sulfur dioxide (SO2). 
9
A higher API indicates stronger pollution concentrations 
and more harmful health effects.
10
 The Ministry of Environmental Protection of China 
(MEP) publishes the daily API for 120 major cities.
11
 Chen, et al. (2012) confirm that the 
API is highly correlated with two alternative measures of air pollution: visibility reported 
by the China Meteorological Administration and Aerosol Optical Depth from the U.S. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration satellites. The API data have been used in 
a few empirical studies (Chen, et al., 2013; Lin, et al., 2011; Viard and Fu, 2013).  We 
choose a sample period from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2012.
12
 After January 1, 
2013, the MEP stops publishing the API and switches to a new air quality index (AQI) for 
74 cities. 
13
 Our two-year sample period provides consistent API data and also a 
comparison group of days in 2011.  
 
When the API is above 50, the major pollutant is identified. PM10 is the major pollutant for 
most of the days in most of cities and vehicles are the major creator of PM10 in cities. For 
example, approximately 53% of Beijing’s PM10 is attributable to motor vehicles: 23% due 
to auto emissions and 30% road dust (Hao, et al., 2005).  PM10 has a linear piecewise 
relationship with API (Andrew, 2008):  
 
PM10 = API,         ; 
PM10 = 2*API - 50,           ; 
PM10 = (7/10)*API + 210,            ; 
PM10 = (4/5)*API + 180,            ; 
PM10 = API + 100,            . 
 
We use both the API and the imputed PM10 to test the effect of waiving highway tolls.  
 
Weather conditions influence emissions and air quality. PM10 concentration is affected by 
precipitation and wind speed (Rost, et al., 2009; Jones, et al., 2010) and ozone is not easily 
formed on cloudy, cool, rainy, or windy days. 
14
 Daily weather conditions include wind 
speed, humidity, temperature, and precipitation and are downloaded from the web site 
                                                          
9
 Each monitoring station records the concentrations of the three pollutants multiple times each day. A daily 
API for each pollutant is calculated at each station. A mean API across stations in a city for each pollutant is 
then calculated and the maximum of these three means is the city-level aggregate API for that day. Source: 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China web site: 
 http://web.archive.org/web/20041018003319/http://www.sepa.gov.cn/quality/background.php  (in Chinese). 
Viard and Fu (2013) provide more discussion of the calculation of API. 
10
 An API below 100 has no health implications. An API between 101and 200 indicates slight to light 
pollution causing slight irritations. An API between 201and 300 indicates moderate to heavy pollution and 
healthy people will be noticeably affected. An API above 300 indicates severe air pollution creating strong 
irritations and even healthy people will experience reduced endurance in activities. 
11
 The data can be downloaded from the MEP web site: http://datacenter.mep.gov.cn/report/air_daily /air_ 
dairy.jsp. 
12
 Expanding the sample to include 2009 and 2010 data generates similar results but doesn’t help model 
identification since tolls are charged all over 2009 and 2010. 
13
 The new data set is at http://datacenter.mep.gov.cn/airdesc.jsp. 
14
 See http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/weather.html. 
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www.wunderground.com. 
15
 The weather data also include visibility which is closely 
related to air pollution. According to Malm (1999), “visibility” is defined as “the greatest 
distance at which an observer can just see a black object viewed against the horizon sky.” 
Visibility depends on the density of particulates that scatter and absorb light and has an 
inverse linear relationship with air quality (Malm, 1999). Huang, et al. (2009) find that 
visibility (and humidity) predicts PM10 very well in Shanghai from 2004 to 2005 period. 
Environmental economic studies have used visibility as a proxy for air pollution, such as 
Du, et al. (2014). 
By the end of 2008, about 95% of expressways in China are tolled (Lin, 2012).  Toll rates 
differ across provinces, highways, and vehicle types: tolls range from RMB 0.26 to 4.75 
per vehicle per kilometer, RMB 0.025 to 0.165 per ton per kilometer, or RMB 3 to 100 per 
vehicle each time passing through an expressway. For passenger vehicles with seven or 
fewer seats, the toll rate can be RMB 0.26 to 0.9 per vehicle per kilometer or RMB 3 to 50 
per vehicle each time.
16
 Because of this complexity of the toll rate structure we need to 
construct a “toll index” for each city to estimate the toll elasticity of air pollution. 
Merging the air pollution and weather data and dropping cities without any tolled 
expressways passing by provides a final sample of 98 cities. Figure 2 shows the map of 
these 98 cities and the highways connecting them. Table 1 presents the summary statistics 
of key variables. Compared with the National Day holiday period in 2011 when highway 
tolls are charged, during the National Day holiday period in 2012 when tolls are waived, 
on average API is 12 higher, PM10 is 19 ug/m
3
 higher, and visibility is 0.4 km lower, 
suggesting stronger air pollution from eliminating tolls. Changes of traffic flow on 
highways are expected to provide consistent evidence but such data currently are not 
publically available in China.  
 
4 Model specification 
During the 2012 National Day holiday, from September 30 to October 7, highway tolls are 
waived for passenger vehicles with seven or fewer seats. This is the first time that the 
highway toll has been waived nationwide and also the only days it is waived during 2012.  
Since both production and consumption activities generate air pollution and holidays alter 
the proportion of these two types of activities, we need to separate the holiday effect. We 
use the 2011 National Day holiday, from October 1 to October 7, during which highway 
tolls are charged, as a control group.  
Our main model is a city fixed effect, panel data model: 
itititiit tfXWNotollyNationaldaP   )(21 ,         (1) 
                                                          
15
 Wind direction information is missing in the historical data. If the main wind direction is relatively 
constant in a city, the city fixed effect in our model can partially control for this. 
16
 Toll rates are set by provincial governments. We assemble the toll rate data for 2011-2012 from each 
provincial government’s web site. 
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where the dependent variable Pit is one of the three measures of air pollution in city i on 
day t: logarithm of air pollution index, PM10, or visibility. Independent variables are 
defined as follows: 
αi: city fixed effect.  
Nationalday: a dummy variable set to 1 if a day is among one of the National Day holidays 
(October 1 to 7, 2011 and September 30 to October 7, 2012).  
Notoll: a dummy variable set to 1 if on a day highway tolls are waived (September 30, 
2012 to October 7, 2012).  
Wit: a vector of daily weather variables for city i on day t including maximum wind speed 
(kilometers per hour), precipitation (millimeters), average humidity (in percentage), and 
average temperature (centigrade).  
Xit:  a vector of other control variables including a weekend dummy, eleven month 
dummies, year 2012 dummy, and a dummy for holidays other than National Day holidays. 
f(t): a flexible polynomial time trend term controlling for unobserved confounding factors 
or trends that may affect daily air quality. Without loss of generality, we consider 
asymmetric time trends before, during, and after the Notoll period. Using symmetric trend 
generates very similar results. 
it is the error term; 1 , 2 ,  , and θ are coefficient vectors to be estimated. Since we 
have controlled for the National Day holiday effect, the coefficient of Notoll, 2 , captures 
the effect of removing highway tolls on air pollution. This interpretation is analogous to a 
differences-in-differences approach. In estimation standard errors are clustered at the city 
level to control for within-city correlation of API.  
Model (1) has a few special cases. First, if we estimate Model (1) by year and consider 
National Day holiday as an exogenous “policy”, then we can compare whether the effects 
of this “policy” are qualitatively different across years. Second, if we choose a small 
window before and after this “policy”, Model (1) can be estimated following the regression 
discontinuity design method since such an estimation can show whether the trend in air 
quality has a “jump” during and after the “policy” period. 17  Finally, as a robustness check, 
we also estimate a city fixed effect model assuming each city has a separate time trend by 
interacting each city dummy with flexible time trend terms. These interaction terms absorb 
unobserved, city-specific, time-varying factors that affect air quality. 
 
                                                          
17
 For an introduction to regression discontinuity design method, see Angrist and Pischke (2009) or Lee and 
Lemieux (2010). For applications of this method in the time series context, see Davis (2008), Chen and 
Whalley (2012), and Viard and Fu (2013). 
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5 Results 
5.1 Suggestive results 
We first estimate Model (1) separately for the 2011 and 2012 sub-samples. We must drop 
the Notoll variable because a toll is charged on all days of 2011 and in 2012 the days 
without tolls coincide with the National Day holiday. We treat the National Day holiday as 
an exogenous “policy” and apply the regression discontinuity design (RDD) method, using 
flexible time trends to control for unobserved confounding factors that affect urban air 
pollution. These estimates can show whether the National Day holidays affect air pollution 
differently in 2011 and 2012.  
Table 2 presents the results. The dependent variable is the logarithm of API. All control 
variables are included but only the coefficients of Nationalday are reported. Panel 1 shows 
that in 2011 the API decreases by between 9% and 21% during National Day holiday 
compared with a regular workday.
 18
 These estimates are robust up to the fifth order time 
trend. 
19
However, Panel 2 shows that in 2012 the API decreases by at most 5% during the 
National Day holiday and the estimates are not stable across different order of time trends. 
Since the only difference between these two National Day holiday periods is that highway 
tolls are waived during the 2012 National Day holiday, Table 2 results suggest that 
eliminating tolls substantially increases air pollution. 
To check whether the above suggestive results are sensitive to the window width before 
and after the “policy”, we also employ the RDD method to estimate the difference in air 
pollution before, during, and after the National Day holidays with a symmetric, narrow 
window. Specifically, we regress log(API) on the Nationalday dummy, weekend dummy, 
four daily weather variables, city fixed effects, and linear and quadratic time trends before, 
during, and after the “policy”,  using a small window of seven days before, during, and 
after the National Day holiday in 2011.
 20
 We estimate the same model using a small 
window of eight days before, during, and after the National Day holiday in 2012.  
Table 3 reports the results. Panel 1 shows that in 2011 air pollution falls by between 8% 
and 11% during the National Day holiday compared with the seven days before and after 
the National Day; however, in 2012, air pollution increases by between 3% to 7% during 
the National Day holiday compared with the eight days before and after the National Day. 
Since the only difference is the removing of tolls in the 2012 National Day holiday period, 
these small-window RDD results are consistent with the Table 2 results. 
                                                          
18
 Using data for 2009 and 2010, we find that air pollution falls by between 7% and 18% during the National 
Day holidays depending on model specifications. This suggests that the trend of holiday effect is relatively 
stable before 2012.  
19
 Higher order time trends are not feasible because of extremely high correlations between some time trend 
terms. 
20
 Higher order time trends cannot be added because of the short sample period. 
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As a visual demonstration, we apply the RDD method and estimate the effect of National 
Day holiday on air pollution for Shanghai, China’s largest city.  Figure 3 shows the 
symmetric quadratic trend seven days before, during, and after the 2011 National Day 
holiday. The trend shifts down slightly during the National Day holiday period (the 
coefficient of Nationalday dummy is -0.171 and statistically insignificant). Similarly, 
Figure 4 shows the symmetric quadratic trend eight days before, during, and after the 2012 
National Day holiday. In contrast, the trend jumps upward significantly during the 
National Day holiday period (the coefficient of Nationalday dummy is 0.363 and 
statistically significant at the 10% level). These demonstrations may be interpreted with 
caution since the sample sizes are just 21 and 24 days, respectively, and for only one city. 
Nevertheless, they provide suggestive evidence on the effect of removiing tolls on air 
pollution. To take into account city heterogeneity and longer-term effect, we apply the 
panel differences-in-differences (DID) method in the next subsection. 
 
5.2: Results from panel DID design 
Table 4 reports the estimate results of our main Model (1) using pooled 2011 and 2012 
data. Column 1 does not include any time trend; flexible time trend terms are added to 
Column 2 through Column 5, from linear, asymmetric time trends before, during, and after 
the “policy” period up to the fourth-order.21 The coefficients of Nationalday and Notoll 
dummies are stable and statistically significant at the 1% level across all columns. During a 
regular National Day holiday period in these two years, air pollution decreases by 20% to 
25% across cities; however, removing highway tolls during the 2012 National Day holiday 
period increases air pollution by 20% to 23%, almost exactly offsetting the pollution 
reduction from the National Day holiday. Since we have conditioned on the 2011 National 
Day holiday effect and used city fixed effects and flexible time trends to control for 
unobserved confounding factors that may affect air quality, the 20% to 23% increase in air 
pollution can be interpreted as the causal effect of removing highway tolls. 
Air pollution is created by both production and consumption activities. During weekends 
and holidays, production activities are cut down but consumption and leisure activities 
increase significantly. Whether air pollution will increase or decrease during weekends and 
holidays is an empirical question (Li, et al., 2010). Table 4 shows that the coefficients on 
Weekend are close to zero and never significant, suggesting that weekend pollution is 
similar to workdays. The coefficients on Other holidays suggest that during other holidays 
air pollution is 3% higher than a regular workday. The coefficients on the Year 2012 
dummy suggest that air quality improves significantly over 2011. The coefficients on the 
four weather condition variables are as expected and are stable across model specifications. 
                                                          
21
 Time trends higher than 5
th
 order cannot be added due to high collinearity between time trend terms. 
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The local features and different development stages of cities in China contribute differently 
to vehicle emissions (Huo, et al., 2011). Therefore, it is important to control for both city 
fixed effects and city-specific time trends. Table 5 presents the results of estimating Model 
(1) with city-specific time trends. We interact city fixed effects with linear, asymmetric 
time trends before, during, and after the “policy” period in Column 2; with both linear and 
quadratic time trends in Column 3; and with linear, quadratic, and cubic time trends in 
Column 4. The results are very similar to those in Table 4: removing highway tolls 
increases air pollution by 21% to 24%. Since the interaction of city fixed effects with 
flexible time trends captures non-parametrically unobserved, city-specific, time-varying 
factors that affect air quality, such as growth in income and car ownership, industry 
composition, and environmental regulations, we believe Table 5 provides compelling 
evidence that eliminating tolls substantially increases air pollution. 
 
5.3 PM10 and visibility results  
Panel 1 of Table 6 reports the effect of waiving highway tolls using Model (1) with the 
logarithm of PM10 level as the dependent variable. The coefficients are fairly stable using 
different order time trends. Compared with a regular workday, PM10 decreases by 25% to 
32% during a regular National Day holiday period but increases by 25 to 30%, or by 20.9 
to 26.8 μg/m3, when highway tolls are waived. 22 We obtain similar results using up to the 
third order city-specific time trends. 
This finding has important health implications. A large number of epidemiologic studies 
have shown that particulate matter is an important risk factor for cardiopulmonary disease 
and mortality. Acute or short-term exposures to particulate pollution can exacerbate 
existing cardiovascular and pulmonary disease, increase hospital admissions, and hasten 
death (Brook, et al., 2004; Brunekreff and Holgate, 2002; Pope, 2000). In the short run, the 
welfare cost of pollution exposure includes reduced activity days (for example, due to 
hospitalization) and acute mortality. Matus, et al. (2012) provide an exposure-response 
(ER) function of 0.0541 additional restricted activity days per year-adult-µg/m
3
 increase in 
PM10 concentration and an ER function of a 0.06% increase in the mortality rate per µg/m
3
 
increase in PM10 concentration in China. Using employment and wage data for all cities at 
or above the prefecture level (that is, excluding small cities) in 2011, a back-of-envelope 
calculation shows that the welfare loss of reduced activity days due to increased PM10 
concentration during the eight days without tolls is RMB 1.183 to 1.517 billion (see 
Appendix A). 
                                                          
22
 The mean PM10 for workdays (excluding weekends and holidays) is 83.6 μg/m
3
. 
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Visibility and air pollution are closely related and suspended particulate matter is the main 
cause of visibility degradation (Diederen, et al., 1985; Hyslop, 2009). Panel 2 of Table 6 
reports the effect of waiving highway tolls on visibility where we have replaced the 
dependent variable in Model (1) with the logarithm of visibility level (measured in 
kilometers). The coefficients on Nationalday and Notoll are stable and statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level across all the columns. Specifically, visibility increases 
by 12% to 14% during a regular National Day holiday break but decreases by 6% to 11% 
or 0.7 to 1.3 kilometers when highway tolls are removed during the 2012 National Day 
holiday break.
23
 Using city-specific time trends generates very similar results. 
This visibility effect has implications for road safety. Studies have found that bad visibility 
is associated with more road vehicle accidents, more severe injuries, and more vehicles 
involved in crashes (Abdel-Aty, et al., 2011; Edwards, 1998; Zhang, et al., 2013). Our 
results therefore imply that removing highway tolls increases not only air pollution but also 
the frequency and severity of traffic accidents. Reduced visibility also implies lower 
amenity and aesthetic values for urban residents (Loehman, et al., 1994; Delucchi, et al., 
2002). 
 
5.4 Testing the intertemporal shift of travel demand 
Although the city-specific time trend models provide compelling evidence that eliminating 
tolls significantly increases air pollution, this effect may be overestimated if trips originally 
scheduled shortly after the National Day holiday simply shift forward to the holiday period 
when tolls are waived. This intertemporal displacement effect is termed “harvesting effect” 
in the environmental health literature (Deschênes and Moretti, 2009), implying that air 
quality will be improved right after the “no toll” policy period since the number of trips 
will have reduced. To test this harvesting effect, we add a dummy variable set to one if a 
day is one of the eight days right after the “no toll” policy period and re-estimate Model (1). 
Panel 1 of Table 7 reports the results. The coefficients on Nationalday and Notoll variables 
are almost identical to those in Table 4, and the coefficients on “Eight days after no toll” 
variable is positive in all five columns and statistically significant in three columns. This 
provides no evidence for the harvesting effect. 
The harvesting effect can run the opposite way, meaning that some trips originally 
scheduled before the “no toll” period will be delayed and shift backward to the “no toll” 
period so that drivers can avoid highway tolls. This implies that the number of trips right 
before the “no toll” policy should decrease and so does air pollution. We add another 
dummy variable set to one if a day is one of the eight days right before the “no toll” policy 
period and re-estimate all models in Panel 1. Panel 2 shows the results: The coefficients on 
                                                          
23
 The mean visibility for workdays (excluding weekends and holidays) is 11.6 kilometer. 
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Nationalday and Notoll variables are very similar to those in Panel 1 and the coefficients 
on both “Eight days before no toll” and “Eight days after no toll” variables are positive and 
significant except one case. This further confirms that there is little harvesting effect. One 
possible interpretation is that in China the majority of employers rarely offer flexible, paid 
holidays except the nation-wide official holidays.
24
 Therefore, workers have to take their 
vacations during those official holidays.
25
 Removing tolls reduces travel cost and therefore 
induces more travels during the “no toll” period.  
 
5.5 Estimate the toll elasticity of pollution 
Highway tolls vary across provinces, highways, and vehicle types. If charged per vehicle 
per kilometer on passenger vehicles, tolls range from RMB 0.26 to 0.9, an average of 0.58. 
As a rough rule of thumb, Table 4 results imply that raising the toll on passenger vehicles 
from zero to RMB 0.58 per vehicle per kilometer can reduce urban air pollution by 20%. 
To be more informative, we replace Notoll dummy by the weighted toll rate in each city to 
estimate the toll elasticity of pollution. We manually collect the toll rate of each highway 
in each city, then use the length of each highway as weight to compute the weighted 
average of highway toll for each city. In our city sample, the mean weighted roll rate is 
RMB 0.4 per kilometer and the maximum 0.76. 
26
 
Table 8 reports the results of panel data models where Notoll dummy is replaced by 
weighted toll rate in each city. The estimated coefficients of weighted toll rate are all 
significant at the 1% level and stable, ranging from -0.31 to -0.49 with a mean value of -
0.40. To translate this coefficient to elasticity, we assume the toll rate increases by 
RMB0.04,  or 10% from the current mean value, thus the air pollution will decrease by 1.6% 
(-0.40*0.04), an elasticity of 0.16, which is close to the estimates of semi-elasticity 
between 0.20 and 0.23 in Table 4. This finding should be informative for local 
governments to design congestion toll policy in the near future. 
 
                                                          
24
 “China has fewest paid vacation days in world”, online at http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-
08/02/content_23125687.htm. 
25
 Another possible interpretation is that some people may expect that highways will be crowded during the 
“no toll” holidays and thus shift their trips forward; some other people may have to postpone their trips back 
home due to traffic congestion during the holiday period. The presence of either case will underestimate the 
Notoll effect.  
26
 In our sample there are four cities, Haikou, Kelamayi, Lasa, and Sanya that charge no highway toll. Both 
Haikou and Sanya are in Hainan province that charge higher gasoline taxes than do other provinces. 
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6 Conclusion 
Vehicles generate congestion and pollution externalities. A toll can be charged to alleviate 
congestion and reduce vehicle emissions. In the absence of a toll the number of vehicles on 
the road will exceed the optimal number that maximizes social welfare. Chinese city 
governments charge tolls to finance highways. For passenger vehicles with seven or fewer 
seats, these tolls range from RMB 0.26 to 0.9 per vehicle per kilometer. When highway 
tolls are waived nationwide for passenger vehicles during the 2012 eight-day National Day 
holiday period, urban air pollution increases by 20%; PM10 increases by 25%; and visibility 
decreases by one kilometer. These effects are not overestimated since we find little 
evidence that drivers shift their trips from before and after “no toll” periods to the “no toll” 
period. We estimate the toll elasticity of air pollution to be 0.16. Our findings suggest that 
the policy of eliminating tolls during holidays generates a significant loss of social welfare: 
the welfare loss from reduced working days due to the negative health effect of an increase 
in PM10 concentration during the “no toll” period is estimated to be at least RMB 1.183 
billion.  
Although due to data availability we are unable to quantify how much the optimal toll 
should be during the national holidays, this study does provide the first empirical evidence 
on the effect of road pricing on air pollution in China; it also complements the scant 
literature on empirical studies of the environmental effect of road pricing. Some Chinese 
cities, notably Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Xiamen, are discussing the feasibility of 
charging congestion tolls to alleviate traffic congestion and air pollution. Our study 
provides a timing and useful reference to the policymakers of those cities.  
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Figure 1: Optimal toll, congestion and pollution externalities 
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 Figure 2: Cities in our sample and highways connecting them  
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Figure 3: Time trends seven days before, during, and after the 2011 National Day holidays 
in Shanghai 
The plotted dots are the sum of residuals from estimating Equation (1) in the main text without Notoll 
dummy and the linear and quadratic time trend. The fitted line allows for a quadratic time trend. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Time trend eight days before, during, and after the 2012 National Day holidays in 
Shanghai 
The plotted dots are the sum of residuals from estimating Equation (1) in the main text without Notoll 
dummy and the linear and quadratic time trend. The fitted line allows for a quadratic time trend. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Variable 
Mean (standard 
deviation): 2011-
2012 
2011 National 
Day holiday 
period 
2012 National 
Day holiday 
period 
t test 
statistic 
Air pollution index 65.7(27.5) 55.2 67 -10.0 
PM10 (μg/m
3
) 84.1 (48.1) 67 86 -9.1 
Visibility(km) 11.6 (7.3) 12.2 11.8 1.1 
Maximum wind speed 
(km/hour) 
7.9 (4.5) 8.1 6.3 7.7 
Precipitation (mm) 1.4 (6.0) 1.6 0.5 4.0 
Average humidity (%) 61.1 (20.3) 62.6 59.9 3.0 
Average temperature 
(cel.) 
14.6 (11.4) 16.5 18.2 -7.5 
National day holiday 
dummy 
0.02(0.14)    
Notoll dummy 0.01 (0.10)    
Weekend dummy 0.29 (0.45)    
Other holidays dummy 0.05 (0.23)    
Note: The t test statistics in the last column tests whether the means of a variable in the 
2011 and 2012 National Day holiday periods are equal.  
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Table 2: National Day holiday effect by year 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Variable No time 
trend 
1
st
 order 
time trend 
2
nd
 order 
time trend 
3
rd
 order 
time trend 
4
th
 order 
time trend 
5
th
 order 
time trend 
 Panel 1: Dependent variable: log(API). Sample period: 2011 
Nationalday -0.206
***
 
(-8.64) 
-0.182
***
 
(-8.16) 
-0.113
***
 
(-5.12) 
-0.115
***
 
(-5.20) 
-0.099
***
 
(-4.27) 
-0.085
*** 
(-3.36) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.371 0.372 0.382 0.386 0.386 0.386 
 Panel 2: Dependent variable: log(API). Sample period: 2012 
Nationalday -0.047
***
 
(-2.71) 
-0.041
*** 
(-2.45) 
-0.008 
(-0.45) 
-0.008 
(-0.48) 
-0.006 
(-0.37) 
0.039
***
 
(-2.26) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.399 0.399 0.403 0.403 0.403 0.406 
Note: Weather variables, month-of-year dummies, weekend dummy, other holidays dummy, and 
city fixed effects are included. Column 1 does not include any time trend terms. Columns 2 to 6 
include polynomial time trend terms up to the fifth order. t statistics are in the parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the city level. Superscripts “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Sample sizes for 2011 and 2012 are 34,738 and 
35,672, respectively. 
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Table 3: Symmetric window RDD results 
 1 2 3 
Variable No time trend 1
st
 order time trend 2
nd
 order time trend 
 Panel 1: Symmetric window (seven days)  before, during, and after 
National Day holiday in 2011 
Nationalday -0.086
*** 
(-3.30) 
-0.076
*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.106
***
 
(-3.37) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.479 0.517 0.518 
Sample size 2,058 2,058 2,058 
 Panel 2: Symmetric window (eight days) before, during, and after 
National Day holiday in 2012 
Nationalday 0.030
** 
(2.05) 
0.054
***
 
(3.50) 
0.066
***
 
(3.10) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.394 0.513 0.513 
Sample size 2,352 2,352 2,352 
Note: Dependent variable is log(API). Weather variables, weekend dummy, and city fixed effects 
are included. In Panel 1, the sample includes 7 days before, during, and after the National Day 
holiday in 2011. In Panel 2, the sample includes 8 days before, during, and after the National Day 
holiday in 2012. t statistics are in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. 
Superscripts “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4: Panel data regression results 
Variable 1  2 3 4 5 
Nationalday -0.246
***
 
(-9.66) 
-0.237
***
 
(-9.47) 
-0.220
***
 
(-8.96) 
-0.212
***
 
(-8.49) 
-0.198
***
 
(-8.54) 
Notoll 0.232
***
 
(6.67) 
0.226
***
 
(6.01) 
0.204
*** 
(5.64) 
0.215
***
 
(5.55) 
0.195
***
 
(5.35) 
Other holidays 0.029
***
 
(4.78) 
0.033
***
 
(5.41) 
0.034
***
 
(5.64) 
0.034
***
 
(5.67) 
0.035
***
 
(5.73) 
Weekend 
 
-0.000 
(-0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.44) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
Year 2012 
 
-0.020
**
 
(-2.42) 
-0.288
***
 
(-3.30) 
-0.333
*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.316
***
 
(-3.59) 
-0.339
***
 
(-3.83) 
Maximum wind speed 
 
-0.017
***
 
(-10.06) 
-0.017
***
 
(-10.10) 
-0.017
***
 
(-10.15) 
-0.017
***
 
(-10.15) 
-0.017
***
 
(-10.14) 
Precipitation 
 
-0.002
***
 
(-4.17) 
-0.002
*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.002
***
 
(-4.24) 
-0.002
***
 
(-4.25) 
-0.002
***
 
(-4.20) 
Average humidity 
 
-0.002
***
 
(-4.35) 
-0.002
***
 
(-4.29) 
-0.002
***
 
(-4.21) 
-0.002
***
 
(-4.17) 
-0.002
***
 
(-4.20) 
Average temperature 
 
0.011
***
 
(6.51) 
0.011
***
 
(6.53) 
0.011
***
 
(6.60) 
0.011
***
 
(6.61) 
0.011
***
 
(6.61) 
Asymmetric time trend No 1
st
 order 2
nd
 order 3
rd
 order 4
th
 order 
Adjusted R
2
 0.372 0.373 0.374 0.374 0.375 
Note: Dependent variable is log(API).All models also include month-of-year dummies and city 
fixed effects. Column 1 does not include time trend. Columns 2 to 5 include time trend before, 
during, and after the “no toll” period up to the fourth order. t statistics are in the parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the city level. Superscripts “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Sample size: 70,400. 
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Table 5: Results from city-specific time trend regressions  
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Nationalday -0.246
*** 
(-9.66) 
-0.238
***
 
(-9.58) 
-0.222
***
 
(-9.08) 
-0.213
***
 
(-8.67) 
Notoll 0.232
***
 
(6.67) 
0.227
*** 
(6.06) 
0.212
***
 
(5.85) 
0.235
***
 
(6.15) 
Asymmetric time trend No  1
st
 order  2
nd
 order  3
rd
 order  
Adjusted R
2
 0.373 0.394 0.407 0.423 
Note: Dependent variable is log(API). All models also include weather variables, month-
of-year dummies, year dummy, weekend dummy, other holidays dummy, and city fixed 
effects; Columns 2-4 also include linear, quadratic, and cubic time trend before, during, 
and after the “no toll” period and their interactions with city fixed effects. These 
coefficients are not reported. t statistics are in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered 
at the city level. Superscripts “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Sample size: 70,400. 
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Table 6: PM10 and visibility results  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
 Panel 1: Dependent variable: log(PM10) 
 Nationalday -0.318
***
 
(-10.15) 
-0.304
***
 
(-9.89) 
-0.280
***
 
(-9.26) 
-0.270
***
 
(-8.74) 
-0.253
***
 
(-8.82) 
Notoll 0.301
***
 
(6.75) 
0.288
***
 
(6.03) 
0.254
***
 
(5.52) 
0.270
***
 
(5.54) 
0.249
***
 
(5.38) 
Asymmetric time trend No 1
st
 order 2
nd
 order 3
rd
 order 4
th
 order 
Adjusted R
2
 0.366 0.366 0.367 0.367 0.368 
Sample size 70,400 
 Panel 2: Dependent variable: log(visibility) 
Nationalday 0.135
***
 
(6.10) 
0.133
***
 
(5.88) 
0.143
*** 
(6.43) 
0.138
***
 
(5.88) 
0.119
***
 
(5.28) 
Notoll -0.103
***
 
(-3.80) 
-0.057
**
 
(-2.04) 
-0.113
***
 
(-3.88) 
-0.101
***
 
(-3.20) 
-0.085
***
 
(-2.63) 
Asymmetric time trend No 1
st
 order 2
nd
 order 3
rd
 order 4
th
 order 
Adjusted R
2
 0.690 0.690 0.690 0.690 0.691 
Sample size 69,534 
Note: All models include weather variables, month-of-year dummies, year dummy, weekend 
dummy, other holidays dummy, and city fixed effects. Columns 2 to 5 also include time trend 
before, during, and after the “no toll” period up to the fourth order. t statistics are in the parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the city level. Superscripts “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7: Testing the intertemporal shift of travel demand 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
 Panel 1 
Nationalday -0.239
***
 
(-9.86) 
-0.226
***
 
(-9.54) 
-0.213
***
 
(-9.07) 
-0.206
***
 
(-8.58) 
-0.198
***
 
(-8.68) 
Notoll 0.232
***
 
(6.66) 
0.223
***
 
(6.03) 
0.202
***
 
(5.61) 
0.214
***
 
(5.56) 
0.195
***
 
(5.29) 
Eight days after no toll 0.047
**
 
(2.15) 
0.064
***
 
(2.80) 
0.042
*
 
(1.91) 
0.035 
(1.52) 
0.003 
(0.12) 
Asymmetric time trend No 1
st
 order 2
nd
 order 3
rd
 order 4
th
 order 
Adjusted R
2
 0.373 0.372 0.374 0.374 0.375 
 Panel 2 
Nationalday -0.240
***
 
(-9.88) 
-0.228
***
 
(-9.62) 
-0.216
***
 
(-9.17) 
-0.208
***
 
(-8.65) 
-0.199
***
 
(-8.75) 
Notoll 0.236
***
 
(6.72) 
0.231
***
 
(6.18) 
0.217
***
 
(5.93) 
0.238
***
 
(5.98) 
0.212
***
 
(5.47) 
Eight days before no toll 0.092
*** 
(7.00) 
0.089
*** 
(6.61) 
0.070
*** 
(5.10) 
0.072
*** 
(5.13) 
0.034
** 
(2.20) 
Eight days after no toll 0.049
**
 
(2.21) 
0.064
***
 
(2.79) 
0.046
**
 
(2.06) 
0.046
**
 
(1.95) 
0.011 
(0.48) 
Asymmetric time trend No 1
st
 order 2
nd
 order 3
rd
 order 4
th
 order 
Adjusted R
2
 0.373 0.372 0.374 0.374 0.375 
Note: Dependent variable is log(API). All models include weather variables, month-of-year 
dummies, year dummy, weekend dummy, other holidays dummy, and city fixed effects. Columns 2 
to 5 also include asymmetric time trend before, during, and after the “no toll” period up to the 
fourth order. t statistics are in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. 
Superscripts “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Sample size: 70,400. 
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Table 8: Toll elasticity of pollution 
Variable 1  2 3 4 5 
Nationalday -0.230
***
 
(-9.73) 
-0.223
*** 
(-9.64) 
-0.209
***
 
(-9.19) 
-0.200
***
 
(-8.63) 
-0.188
***
 
(-8.58) 
Weighted toll rate -0.490
***
 
(-7.10) 
-0.425
***
 
(-5.16) 
-0.352
*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.347
***
 
(-3.06) 
0.313
***
 
(-2.68) 
Asymmetric time trend  No 1
st
 order 2
nd
 order 3
rd
 order 4
th
 order 
Adjusted R
2
 0.372 0.373 0.374 0.374 0.375 
Note: All models include weather variables, month-of-year dummies, year dummy, weekend 
dummy, other holidays dummy, and city fixed effects. Columns 2 to 5 also include asymmetric 
time trend before, during, and after the “no toll” period up to the fourth order. t statistics are in the 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. Superscripts “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Sample size: 70,400. 
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Appendix A: 
According to the China Urban Statistical Yearbook 2012 published by the China Statistical 
Press,  in 2011, the total employment in all Chinese cities at or above the prefecture level is 
268.1984 million; the average annual wage is RMB42,790.9. With 48 working weeks per 
year and 5 days a week, the daily wage is about RMB178. Matus, et al. (2012) estimate an 
exposure-response function of 0.0541 additional restricted activity days per year-adult-
µg/m
3
 increase in PM10 concentration. Since waiving highway tolls during the eight-day 
National Day holiday period in 2012 increases PM10 by 20.9 to 26.8 µg/m
3
, evaluating the 
value of a restricted day at the daily average wage level, this amounts to RMB 1.183 to 
1.517 billion welfare loss during those eight days due to the increase of PM10. 
 
 
